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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The author, a well know theorist and activist of 
the civil rights movement and the movement 
against the Vietnam War, published the first 
part of this article in 1968. There, he analyses 
the emergence of the New Left in the United 
States –and its global connection– through the 
social structure, the actors’ class background 
and their cultural configuration to account for 
the aspirations and limits that accompanied the 
middle class youth that lead this movement. The 
dilemmas that emerged between the racial, eth-
nic, social and economic axes that defined the 
actors framed the diverse social movements and 
throw light on the promises, scope and weak-
nesses that characterized them.
In the post scriptum, written explicitly for 
the Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y So-
ciales 50 years later with a great analytical and 
existential wisdom, the author inspects the way 
in which class profile, radicalization and sepa-
ratism led to an isolation of the New Left from 
the natural support basis it should have reached. 
It evaluates the consequences of its integration 
either to the Old Left or to the system, as it ma-
nifests in the turn towards right that progressive 
and democratic sectors had in the United States. 
NOTA INTRODUCTORIA
El autor, teórico y activista del movimiento de 
los derechos civiles y de los movimientos contra 
la guerra en Vietnam, publicó la primera parte 
de este artículo en 1968. En él, analiza la emer-
gencia de la Nueva Izquierda en Estados Unidos 
–y su conexión global– a partir de la estructura 
social, la pertenencia de clase de los propios ac-
tores y su configuración cultural para dar cuenta 
de las aspiraciones y limitantes que acompaña-
ron a la juventud de clase media que encabezó 
este movimiento. Los dilemas que emergieron 
entre la configuración étnico-racial, social y 
económica de los actores enmarcados en el mo-
vimiento por los derechos humanos arrojan luz 
sobre las promesas, alcances y debilidades que 
éste tuvo. En el post scriptum, escrito explíci-
tamente para la Revista Mexicana de Ciencias 
Políticas y Sociales 50 años después, con una gran 
sabiduría analítica y existencial, el autor revisa 
el modo como el perfil de clase, la radicaliza-
ción y el separatismo condujo a un aislamiento 
de la Nueva Izquierda de las naturales bases de 
apoyo que debió haber alcanzado. Evalúa las 
consecuencias ya sea de su integración a la Vieja 
Izquierda o bien al sistema, tal como se mani-
fiestan en el viraje a la derecha que los sectores 
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Furthermore, he underlines the way it influen-
ced the inequality and vulnerability that prevails 
among the social class –the “precateriat”– the 
left should have represented, and projects itself 
in the current situation and in Trumpism. Wi-
thout a doubt, the depth, realism and theoretical 
and practical vision of Michael Walzer have tur-
ned him into one of the representative figures of 
political theory. JBL.
Keywords: New Left; 1960s civil rights move-
ment; Vietnam War; movement radicalization; 
political theory; United States. 
progresistas y democráticos tuvieron en Estados 
Unidos, y cómo se reflejó en la situación de des-
igualdad y vulnerabilidad prevaleciente en gran 
parte de las clases sociales que la izquierda debió 
representar, e incluso en el Trumpismo hoy. Sin 
duda, la profundidad, realismo y visión teórica 
y práctica de Michael Walzer lo han convertido 
en una de las figuras representativas de la teoría 
política. JBL.
Palabras clave: Nueva Izquierda; movimiento 
de derechos sociales de los sesenta; guerra de 
Vietnam; radicalización del movimiento; teoría 
política; Estados Unidos.
Introduction
It is not easy to get at the New Left. Already encumbered with its own  myths, hard 
pressed by the endemic frustrations and outrages of American society, racially split, infil-
trated by Old Left sectarians, the object of a curious literary cult, it is no longer the open 
movement of the early sixties with its buoyant optimism and transparent passion. Whe-
ther anything at all survives of the radical efflorescence of those years is itself a question. I am 
going to answer that question in the affirmative, but only after a rather tortuous descrip-
tion of what has been a tortuous, though also very short, history. Rarely in the past has a 
“new” radicalism been confronted so quickly with so many impossible cho·ices; rarely has the 
political resiliency and stamina of the young been so severely tested. Today, a sense of isola-
tion, an embittered mood, a dangerous desperation mark many elements of the New Left 
like so many scars of battles fought and lost: the collapse of the civil rights movement, the 
failure to organize the poor, the continued escalation of the Vietnam war.
The war is perhaps the most important explanation for all that has happened. It is 
for many of us, and especially for young radicals, a daily humiliation simply to live in the 
United States while that war is waged in our name. And that humiliation breeds the terri-
ble anger (and the self-hate) and the desire for dramatic “confrontations” that have become 
characteristic of many student leftists. But there are other reasons, if not better ones, more 
deeply rooted in the experiences of the past seven years.
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The Post-Affluent Generation
As a visible political movement, the New Left has its origin in the wave of sympathy and 
support for the Negro civil-rights struggle that swept northern campuses in the early six-
ties and culminated in Mississippi Summer 1964. But if the militancy of black students 
is  easy enough to account for, that of their white counterparts is not. Negro radicalism, 
even in its most extreme forms, fits admirably into any of a dozen conventional explana-
tions; the white New Leftists are harder to figure out. The struggle for civil rights was 
less the cause than the occasion for their commitment. Once the call went out, it be-
came clear that many of them had been waiting –but why had they been waiting?– and 
that they had been prepared for political action by something other than the sheer oppres-
siveness of their surroundings. 
New Leftists tended to be middle-class students, often at the most prestigious of our 
universities. Theirs was the radicalism of a generation for whom neither security nor money 
had ever been a problem. Their parents, by and large, had been children during the worst 
of the Depression, had married and raised families of their own during the War and the 
post-war boom of the forties, and had rarely managed to convey to their offspring any 
sense but that of easy expectation. They had outlived, outgrown, or outmanoeuvred the var-
ious radicalisms of their youth, arriving finally, many of them, at a state of mind which 
eager sociologists called the end of ideology. They were comfortable, often newly comfort-
able, and their children inherited from them, in addition to their comforts, only the 
vaguest idealism, corroded by a new and very strong feeling for the possible pleasures of 
private life. Yet many of these same children became New Left radicals. 
It is a cliché of current political analysis that the New Left grew up as a youthful re-
volt against the emptiness and hypocrisy of middle-class life. As with most other clichés, 
there is a truth here, but a truth badly stated. Middle-class life is  both interesting and 
honest enough so long as its discipline serves a real purpose, that is, the pursuit of security 
and wealth by men and women who possess (or remember having possessed) neither. 
The radicalism of young people today is not so much a revolt against the emptiness of 
their parents’ lives –for their parents’ lives have often been full of struggle, risk-taking, 
and achievement– as against the possible emptiness of their own lives were they simply 
to take over what their parents have won. For many of them the discipline of profes-
sional careers and suburban respectability makes no sense: it will bring them nothing 
they don’t already have. 
Like every new generation, they want useful and exciting work to do. But what is 
the useful and exciting work of the post-affluent generation? There is a very old “Old Left” 
answer to this question, to the effect that only when material goods have been won is it 
possible to pursue moral goods. “ First feed the face, and then talk right and wrong.” The 
88
Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales⎥ Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Nueva Época, Año lxiii, núm. 234 ⎥ septiembre-diciembre de 2018 ⎥ pp. 85-98⎥ ISSN-2448-492X
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2018.234.65558
⎥ Michael Walzer
faces of middle-class America are well-fed, so now it is the time to talk. And of course the 
first thing young people have to say is that the world they would have inherited (and 
will yet inherit) from their parents is all wrong. They mean partly that it is wrong that 
their easy affluence isn’t more widely shared, that in the pursuit of security and wealth 
so many Americans have been left so far behind. 
But the specific content of New Left radicalism is not determined by the culture of 
poverty any more than it is determined by southern Negro culture –neither of which it’s 
leading participants can possibly know, but rather by the culture of plenty. And what 
New Leftists dislike about the culture of plenty is precisely that controlled efficiency, that 
careful calculation, that concentration on self and family, that inwardly focused zeal, all 
of which have been central to the rise of the middle class as a whole and of this or that 
ethnic group into the middle class, and all of which today’s poor will one day emulate. 
The politics of this culture is largely passive (whatever its conventional moral commit-
ments), marked by the same inward concentration: middle-class Americans surrender 
almost eagerly the very idea of an active public life, forgo the excitements of political 
action, and seek instead (and get) protection and peace of mind at the hands of a benev-
olent state bureaucracy. 
The New Left defines itself by opposition: hence its counter-ethos, focused outward, 
reaching for personal contacts beyond the family circle, emphasizing spontaneity and open-
ness. And hence its counter-politics, demanding a share in the perils and pleasures of power, 
planning to replace benevolent administration (or certain specified benevolent administra-
tors) with small group democracy and popular participation. It might well be said of most 
New Leftists that they can afford to be warm, loose, open, and free; that they have time 
enough and to spare for public activity; and that they have been well trained indeed in all 
the skills necessary for political participation. But this is no disparagement of their zeal; it 
merely suggests that their zeal is closely connected, as is everyone else’s, to their social po-
sition. New Leftism is the politics of a post-affluent class, or of some part of that class, and 
is probably a politics fully available only to members of that class.
Unfortunately, however, it has only sometimes been possible for young radicals to 
centre their activities in those social areas or to concentrate on those issues where their 
ideology and experience are directly relevant. Most often they have been driven by the 
condition of their society and by the moral demands of their age to involve themselves in 
the life and politics of pre-affluent groups. Thus, some of them have engaged themselves 
in the Negro struggle for equality and others in the war (some even in the War) on poverty. 
And they have sought, as best they could, to apply their ideology and act out their zeal in 
radically unfamiliar circumstances. 
The primary result of this effort is the theory and practice of community organizing, 
the central theme and the dominant mystique of the New Left today.
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Community Organizing
Community organizing might be crudely described in this way: it is an effort to teach 
participatory democracy to the poor. Or, less crudely, it is an effort to persuade the poor 
that they have a great deal to gain through a particular sort, and less to gain through 
any other sort, of political activity. I should say at once that not many of the poor have 
been persuaded, and perhaps for good reasons. For the most immediate goals of poor 
people in the United States today are most unlikely to be won through community organi-
zing in the New Left style. That is not to say that such organizing is of no value, even in 
the short run, but it is valuable only in so far as it plays into or leads toward the creation of 
larger organizations –trade unions and political machines– of a sort that New Leftists ge-
nerally do not regard with favour. The struggles of pre-affluent men and women require 
for their success two things above all, mass and discipline, and New Left organizing, in 
part precisely because of its personal intensity and democratic virtue, cannot provide 
either. The one great advantage of the poor is their number, and that can only be given its 
proper weight when all the poor in a given area are mobilized for some concerted ac-
tion, through union solidarity, for example, or bloc voting, mass demonstrations, and 
community boycotts. Popular participation obviously plays a significant part in any such 
mobilization, but so does central (and sometimes charismatic) leadership, an efficient 
staff, and a widespread willingness to obey commands. Full-scale internal democracy 
may have to be sacrificed –as it often has been in socialist parties and trade unions in the 
past– for the sake of the immediate struggle.
It has been one of the achievements of the New Left to remind us (again!) of the full extent 
of that sacrifice and of the legacy it leaves to the future. That legacy is twofold: bureaucratic 
service organizations, centrally controlled, generally benevolent, but unresponsive to popular 
demands, on the one hand; and passive members with only the dimmest memory of the bat-
tles waged in their name, on the other. If the most pressing purposes of the poor are served by 
this outcome (and they are), surely it is not amiss to suggest that certain broader human pur-
poses are not. This is the burden of radical criticism today and it is the key reason for New 
Left attempts to organize the poor in other than the obvious and conventional ways. Some 
New Leftists, of course, argue that the conventional ways won’t work, won’t bring even the lim-
ited gains for which they were designed. That seems to me wrong, and perhaps it would be 
useful to suggest just how wrong it is by attempting a quick outline of the conventional ways 
and the limited gains. I mean to point up the precise role and ultimate inadequacy of New Left 
organizing and, at the same time, the possible truth of the New Left critique. The five stages 
that I am going to describe have been derived from the history of the labour movement and 
of various ethnic groups: I believe they apply also to today’s poor in general and to Negroes 
in particular, though perhaps to Negroes only with some amendment.
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Stage one: passivity –sporadic violence. This is a period of oppression sullenly endured. 
Poverty is opposed and sometimes overcome only by individual efforts. The poor, whether 
identified ethnically, racially, or simply economically, constitute what Marx called a class 
in itself but not for itself. Its members are invisible as men; they are treated in effect 
like things. Occasionally they rebel against this treatment, but the rebellions are formless, 
without discipline or program, rural or urban jacqueries.
Stage two: early mobilization –demonstrations, riots– sectarian activity. Now group 
consciousness begins to develop and with it there comes a proliferation of (generally tiny) 
associations of militants who claim to represent the group as a whole and who turn 
out radical, often imaginative, programs in its name. Sometimes these are secret associ-
ations, pledged brotherhoods with blood oaths and an esoteric lingo; sometimes open 
bands of ideological zealots; sometimes they are made up of home-grown militants; 
sometimes, as in the case of the New Left today, of missionary radicals. These sectarian 
clubs really represent nobody, but they do help to stir up and they also symbolize a new 
mood of self-assertion, manifest also in demonstrations, strikes, and riots –in which the 
sectarians play a part, sometimes an important part. None of these, however, can yet be 
sustained; nor, when they are brutally suppressed, do they leave behind significant or-
ganizational residues.
Stage three: high mobilization –political parties and machines, trade unions. Genu-
inely representative organizations at last appear, usually operating within the political 
or economic system, challenging its present elites but not necessarily its basic structure. 
These organizations can be more or less radical in character, their agitators commonly 
employ a populist rhetoric of one sort or another. The sectarian militants are gradually 
pushed out of them, however, as large numbers of men and women rush to join, ready 
now to accept the discipline and share in the hard work necessary to sustain co-operative 
action. Bloc voting and strikes are typical expressions of the new political competence 
of previously oppressed and excluded social classes. Both, it should be said, have only 
limited purposes.
Stage four: partial success –accommodation. The oppressed groups, or a significant num-
ber of their members, break into the affluent or near-affluent world, which expands to 
admit them. Unlike the old aristocracy, the Western middle classes seem capable of in-
finite expansion. This is true in large part because of the economic growth which they 
champion, but it is also true because the middle classes have no exclusive style; their way 
of life can be imitated and sustained at different income levels. Hence rising groups have 
been able to establish themselves, if not on the peaks of bourgeois wealth and power, then, 
so to speak, on the slopes –higher or lower. They seize one or another local government, 
and use its financial resources to help themselves. They win bargaining power in one or 
another industry and use that to boost wages, establish grievance machinery, etc. These 
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are real successes, which should not be denigrated; they are also partial successes, which 
do not fulfil the programs of stages two and three.
Stage five: demobilization –bureaucracy. Even partial successes have to be defended, but 
they don’t have to be defended by the same kind of organizations that achieved them. The 
relatively high level of mobilization and action necessary to the achievement now ceases 
to be necessary. Active participants are largely displaced by competent bureaucrats; open 
struggle gives way to private negotiation. Tests of strength still occasionally occur; it is 
possible to imagine temporary reversions to stage three. But by and large accommoda-
tion works; it gives rise to a characteristic passivity, manifest now as privatization, the 
enjoyment of the limited delights of middle-class society, the rearing of children capable 
of a new discontent.
This is the long-term process into which New Leftists have inserted themselves by jour-
neying south or into the slums and ghettos of our northern cities. Their stated purpose is 
to avoid its likely outcome. They are, after all, the products of that outcome, and so they 
know or think they know, and even more they feel, how awful it is. I suspect they have 
some difficulty communicating that sense, even if it does serve to reinforce the natural de-
fensiveness of oppressed and deprived social groups. Has there ever been a myth more 
generally useful than that of the poor little rich boy, here personified by the young radical 
from the suburbs who seeks refuge in the slums? But since this young radical is committed 
to teaching slum dwellers those political skills necessary to escape the slums, and since that 
escape is widely desired, his position must be extraordinarily ambivalent and painful. 
For where will the poor go when they escape (either individually or collectively) except 
into one or another section of middle-class America? This is a difficulty which some 
New Leftists have resolved by finding, or pretending to find, values among the poor superior 
to those they knew at home; the poor already have a collective life –a life focused outward 
to the street and the gang rather than inward to the family– and, above all, a personal 
looseness and spontaneity which any middle-class American, so it is said, might well envy 
(and which many do envy). Hence they need freedom and power –to be what they are–
rather than bourgeois wealth and security. Possibly a discovery of some moral significance 
is involved here, even if it is often marred by a perverse sentimentality. But what political 
conclusions can be drawn from it? On the one hand, the poor cannot win even minimal po-
litical power without transforming themselves, not totally, but in important ways. And on 
the other, post-affluent middle-class men and women cannot become either poor or Ne-
gro, no matter how hard they try. Such parallels as may exist between New Left and ghetto 
styles are temporary and coincidental, not harbingers of a shared future.
In practice, New Left community organizers move in two rather different directions, 
both of which lead them away from the specific content of their own ideology, away from 
participatory democracy if not from small groups. Some of them –perhaps the best of 
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them– throw themselves into the conventional Old Left work of organizing the poor into 
unions and political machines, striving for marginal differentiation, but often rediscov-
ering Old Left illusions about the long-term effects of their work. They argue, as Marxists 
did before them, that this time accommodation will not be possible, this time the orga-
nized poor will lead a revolution rather than another invasion of middle-class society. 
Other New Leftists have pursued the logic of their sentimental identification with the poor 
as far as it will go. They identify not only with the American poor, but with the poor the 
world over; they see the ghetto writ large in the Third World; they describe ghetto riots and 
guerrilla insurrections as if they were the same thing. They extend their commitment at 
the expense of its efficacy and perhaps because it has had, so far, so little efficacy. And 
then they eagerly await what they can hardly participate in: an apocalyptic Third World 
challenge to the America they grew up in. What the American poor make of all this 
can only be imagined.
New Leftists went into the slums for two reasons: because they were conventional mid-
dle-class youth, well-trained and highly competent, with something to teach; because they 
were unconventional middle-class youth, radically discontented, contemporary narodniks, 
certain that they had something to learn. The two reasons were both good ones, but 
the tension between them was hard to live with, especially in difficult conditions of daily 
struggle and danger. What has often (not always) happened, I think, is that middle-class 
radicals at work in the slums and ghettos have lost confidence in their own talents, above 
all in the value of their critical faculties and self-discipline, and have become the passive 
advocates of the going form of slum and ghetto militancy (as of the going form of Third 
World militancy), whatever its precise content. This is perhaps especially the case with 
Black Power, which seems so entirely at odds with any authentic New Left ideology, but 
which few New Leftists would today repudiate. It is also true more generally: the moral 
and psychic tensions of the encounter in the ghetto, for example, go a long way toward ex-
plaining the current New Left view of violence, with its peculiar mix of fascination and fear. 
Violence is one of the things middle class radicals learned about among the poor, from 
the poor themselves, and from the oppressors of the poor. The New Left originally was 
committed to non-violence, indeed to a special sort of gentleness, openness, personal 
contact, and cooperation –all of these post-affluent values. America as a whole was and 
is differently committed, and the politics of personal contact was first transformed into 
the politics of “confrontation” with all its rhetorical extravagance and misplaced emo-
tion through the experience of community organizing, the encounter with the other 
America. The young missionary in the slums had endlessly to prove himself in the face of 
local suspicion and police brutality. Often in proving himself he lost, himself, surren-
dered his special vision and his greatest strengths, and ceased to be useful to the people 
he had come to help. Among experienced New Leftists, community organizing is said to 
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have a “radicalizing” effect; perhaps it does; it also has an alienating effect, turning mid-
dle-class radicals into vicarious guerrillas and Leninist ideologues –neither of these being 
much-needed sorts of people in America today.
The Vietnam War
The continued escalation of the Vietnam war has served to aggravate all these tendencies. 
It over-determines the New Left thrust toward rage, alienation, self-hate, and ideologi-
cal rigidity; it produces an apolitical politics in which what seems to be at issue is more 
often the integrity of the individuals involved than the policy of the state. I don’t mean 
to suggest that the New Left response to the war –there hasn’t, of course, been a uni-
form response– has been irrational or even that it’s wrong; I’m not sure what a proper 
response would be. America these days is infinitely hard on its radicals. All of us have 
come, however reluctantly, to share Allen Ginsberg’s vision: “I saw the best minds of 
my generation destroyed by madness, starving, hysterical, naked.” Perhaps New Lef-
tists are especially susceptible, and not only because they are –as they undoubtedly 
are– among the best minds of the new generation; they are especially susceptible also 
because of their anomalous position in the other America. Their authentic ideology is 
a response to the special world of affluence, efficiency, and bureaucracy; their authen-
tic politics is one of participation and personal responsibility. But neither this ideology 
nor this politics provides any adequate means of coping with a brutal, immoral, and 
seemingly endless war, or with the men who carry on that war. In a peculiar way New 
Leftism is parasitic on liberalism; it takes off, so to speak, from the peaks of liberal suc-
cess. When liberals act like the ugliest reactionaries, the New Left is disarmed –capable 
certainly of the most passionate denunciations, the most outraged expressions of be-
trayal and contempt, all of this well-deserved, but utterly incapable of effective action and 
sometimes even of coherent thought. Young radicals have talked a great deal about 
building a mass movement against the war, but the techniques they have adopted (and 
which are probably most appropriate to them) are ill-suited to that goal. They tend ins-
tead to create enclaves of moral men in an ugly and insane world, men whose mark is 
not their commitment of middle-class competence and discipline to a cause, but rather 
their willingness to “put their bodies on the line.” But what else ought they to do? It is 
not as if anyone had succeeded in building an anti-war movement distinguished by its 
size, its unity, or its effectiveness, which New Leftists might join or where they might 
work part-time even while maintaining their enclave. In the absence of a meaningful 
liberalism the burden of moral expression has fallen disproportionately on them, and 
they have both assumed that burden and suffered from it.
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At the same time, the war has intensified an ideological development that began 
in the slums. It has led New Leftists to see the affluent world from which they came 
as a world literally dependent upon the systematic exploitation of masses of men at 
home and abroad. The theory of imperialism is today more widely accepted in the 
United States than at any time in the recent past (with some reason, after all), and 
this means that one of the most important Old Left ideologies has become a prevalent 
New Left ideology. The more post-affluent radicals are driven to confront the pain-
ful realities of the pre-affluent world, the more such old ideologies are likely to gain 
ground. For they have, whatever their intellectual cogency, a certain moral relevance 
to the social conditions in which they were bred. Not necessarily such a relevance as 
will make them useful guides to political action: their effect is more often to make 
possible plausible explanations for the failure of whatever action is undertaken, and 
then to provide plausible reasons for a withdrawal from a corrupted America into 
sectarian rectitude. So the New Left inherits not the victories but the defeats of the past, 
and insofar as it makes its peace with that inheritance, begins to transform itself from a 
moral enclave into a political sect. That transformation has not yet gone very far; the New 
Left still possesses many of its original qualities. Whether these can survive the Vietnam 
war, however, is a hard question.
So long as that war continues, opposition to it is bound to grow, and the New Left 
forms of that opposition –most crucially draft resistance– are also going to grow. Draft 
resistance is not likely to end the war; nor is the New Left, having carried personal respon-
sibility to such a pitch, likely to function usefully in whatever more moderate anti-war 
movement the country may eventually produce. Too many New Leftists have come 
to doubt the very capacity of the country to offer a politics they might support. The best 
that can be hoped for is that draft resistance will shame liberals into a less pusillanimous 
opposition to the war. Then the moral fellowship that it generates in the New Left will not 
be so totally alienated from American life as to be incapable of functioning creatively in 
the post-war world.
Post Scriptum
I wrote this essay early in 1968; it was published that same year. I am writing now half a 
century later. My account of the New Left was based on personal experience; I was inten-
sely engaged in both the civil rights and anti-war movements. But I was a little older than 
the student radicals, and I had effectively aligned myself with the “old left” by joining the 
editorial board of Dissent magazine. So I worked closely with my more youthful comrades 
–but also watched them with a sometimes wary eye. I think that my account of their poli-
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tics and of its likely ineffectiveness was mostly right; my sense of their (and our) future was 
mostly wrong. Here in the United States, it’s not been a good half century.
The breakup of the 1960s Left continued in the years after 1968. A strident militancy 
replaced community organizing, both among black civil rights activists and among the an-
ti-war warriors, who were almost entirely white. The nationalism of the Black Panthers, who 
paraded proudly with guns in hand, may have met some kind of emotional need, but it did 
not make for an effective politics. Minorities need allies; they need to build coalitions if they 
are to advance their interests, and the Panthers were determined to go it alone.
The militancy of anti-war politics was of a similar kind, drifting toward violence, aim-
ing to “bring the war home.” The fact is that we, the anti-war activists, had already, by 1968, 
turned the country against the war. And now we needed to take credit for that, claim vic-
tory, even if it was incomplete –and work to build the largest possible movement to actually 
stop the war. But that’s just what we didn’t do. Militancy and violence produced a sectarian 
politics; the war dragged on, and the New Left pretty much disappeared. Well, there was a 
brief appearance of an American Maoism--much less interesting than the French variety. 
What happened to the young radicals? Some of them simply returned to the middle class 
from which they had come; they became, as one of their sharpest critics remarked, dentists. 
The best of them, after some period of recovery, joined the older left and went to work with 
labor unions and the established organizations of the liberal-left –defending free speech, 
voting rights, and the welfare state. Many of the women of the 1960s became the feminists 
of the 1970s. Feminism and gay rights are the success stories of the past half century. 
But the larger success that I foresaw –of blacks, and women, and Hispanic and Asian im-
migrants, and every minority group, fighting their way into a steadily expanding and more 
and more secure middle class– has not come to pass. That kind of success depended on an 
expanding economy and also on the ability of the old left, of the labor movement and its 
allies, to shape economic policy. Instead we have endured neo-liberal economics, growing 
inequality, and the creation of a new class, the “precariat”–men and women living on the 
edge, their lives precarious, their income and well-being vulnerable to unemployment and 
foreclosure. And the Democratic Party, which looked in the 1930s and again in the 1960s 
as if it were becoming the American version of Social Democracy, drifted rightwards and 
became the advocate of a gentler neo-liberalism.
The New Left, of course, disdained social democracy, but that was in fact the future it 
should have aimed at –the best we could have done. I now suspect that the drift of Amer-
ican politics toward the right and then the farther right began in the 1960s. Let me tell a 
story that suggests the beginning.
In 1967 I was co-chair of the Cambridge Neighborhood Committee on Vietnam. We 
were attempting to organize the city against the war. As part of our organizing effort, we put 
a statement on the election ballot affirming the city’s opposition to the war –so we could go 
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door to door asking for votes. In the November referendum, 40% of the Cambridge elector-
ate voted against the war. A graduate student in sociology did a statistical study of the vote 
and discovered (to our dismay) that the greater the value of your house, the higher the rent 
you paid, the more likely you were to vote against the war. We lost every working class, ev-
ery ethnic neighborhood, in the city.
We should have expected this, though being old and new leftists, with conventional views 
about the working class, we didn’t. The people canvassing for us were middle-class students, 
just like the students I described in my essay. Because they were students and while they 
were students, they were exempt from the draft. Going door to door, they were talking to 
people whose kids weren’t exempt; many of them were in Vietnam. This was a cross-class 
engagement, but not one that pushed worker families toward the left. The push was in the 
other direction –and it was greatly intensified by some of the anti-war activists who insisted 
on carrying Viet Cong flags in every demonstration. We offended the patriotism of the peo-
ple we were trying to convince. We should have been carrying American flags and arguing 
that patriotism required opposition to the war.
So that was the beginning of the Left’s break with its natural (as we thought) constit-
uency –the first appearance of the people who became the “Reagan Democrats,” many of 
whom, with their children, ended up voting for Donald Trump. Of course, many other 
things happened between 1968 and 2016. The rightward drift of many (not all) American 
workers doesn’t have to do only with the supposed lack of patriotism on the left. Social is-
sues like abortion and gay marriage, which didn’t figure at all in New Left politics, have also 
had a major impact. But the simple fact that the Left can’t mobilize its old class base goes a 
long way toward explaining our current situation: inequality, vulnerability, anger, frustra-
tion –and Trumpism.
But maybe, just maybe, we are on the brink of a leftist revival –which will be, again, the 
work of the young.
Michael Walzer
August, 2018
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